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The cease-fire agreement and peace talks between the government of Sri Lanka and LTTE seemed to offer the possi-
bility of an end to a decades-long, catastrophic 
conflict. Some 683,000 
persons were internal-
ly displaced, of whom 
more than 174,000 lived 
in welfare centers and re-
settlement villages when 
the cease-fire was signed. 
The agreement recog-
nized “the importance of 
improving living condi-
tions for all inhabitants 
affected by the conflict,”1 
and in this respect, the 
return of IDPs and reha-
bilitation of war-affected 
areas were clear and im-
mediate priorities. In-
ternational organizations and donors agreed, 
believing that such rehabilitation offered oppor-
tunities for the displaced and allowed the po-
tential to build confidence between the national 
government and LTTE.2
A major mine-action program has been underway in Sri Lanka since 2002, when a 
cease-fire agreement between the government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Eelam was signed. However, after a seemingly inexorable escalation in vio-
lent guerrilla tactics used by the LTTE, open warfare resumed, and in May 2009, the 
government announced that it had achieved military victory over the LTTE. This arti-
cle traces the various ways that the increase in conflict affected mine-action activi-
ties in Sri Lanka. 
by Chris Rush [ Geneva Call ]
Sri Lanka: Mine Action in 
          a Deteriorating Environment
The presence of anti-personnel landmines 
in areas where the displaced would resettle was 
a major hindrance to rehabilitation efforts,3 as 
these devices were utilized extensively by both 
sides in previous phases 
of the conflict. The exact 
number of landmines 
that had been laid was 
unknown, but it was es-
timated to be between 
1.5 and 2 million.4 
The issue grew increas-
ingly urgent as people 
began spontaneously re-
turning to their homes.3 
While neither the gov-
ernment of Sri Lanka nor 
the LTTE had renounced 
the use of anti-personnel 
mines3—allowing the pos-
sibility of the future use of 
these weapons in the event of renewed hostilities—
donor governments and institutions felt that this 
stance should not be an impediment to support-
ing mine action and provided a significant level of 
funding for mine-action activities.5 
A variety of agencies, both na-
tional and international, began 
work on mine-action projects under 
the coordination of Sri Lanka’s Na-
tional Steering Committee for Mine 
Action. Clearance of mine-affected 
areas was one of the main priorities, 
and a number of international agen-
cies began clearing areas jointly 
held by the government and LTTE. 
There was optimism about the 
possibility of swift mine-clearance 
progress. Indeed, in the first few 
years after the cease-fire was signed, 
the optimism seemed well-placed; 
for instance, it was noted that clear-
ly defined mined areas—mostly 
fenced and marked—led to a Lev-
el Two Survey6 being conducted in 
just six months, a task described as 
“impossible in any other country.”5 
In 2004, the Sri Lankan government 
set a target of achieving a mine-free 
country by the end of 2006.4 How-
ever, after the LTTE pulled out of 
peace talks in 2003, there was a 
gradual worsening of relations be-
tween the parties to the conflict. 
Initially, this animosity resulted in 
isolated and sporadic outbreaks of 
violence, but there was a more rapid 
escalation in conflict beginning in 
2006, with more or less open war-
fare ensuing the following year. This 
fighting culminated in the abroga-
tion of the cease-fire by the govern-
ment of Sri Lanka in January 2008. 
The use of AP mines is illustra-
tive of the changing tactics of the 
LTTE. While the early years of the 
cease-fire were characterized by a 
general absence of credible allega-
tions of the use of AP mines, the 
reality changed as the situation de-
teriorated. In a meeting with Geneva 
Call in 2005, the LTTE stated that it 
fully recognized the importance of 
removing mines, and promised that 
new mines would not be emplaced.7 
However, allegations of mine use 
were levelled against the LTTE in 
2006,8 and such claims were more 
numerous and specific the following 
year.9 The LTTE denied all charges,9 
and the organization asserted that 
if mines were still being laid, it was, 
in fact, government forces that were 
laying them.10 
From the information availa-
ble, it was difficult to truly evaluate 
mine use in the country, so in 2006, 
Geneva Call wrote to both the gov-
ernment of Sri Lanka and the LTTE 
to request approval of a mission to 
investigate and verify the allega-
tions. It should be emphasized that 
because neither party had banned 
the use of landmines, they had no 
obligation to approve such a course 
of action. Still, it was disappoint-
ing when neither party agreed to the 
proposed verification mission.9 Al-
though the allegations of the post-
cease-fire agreement mine use were 
mainly against the LTTE, the Land-
mine Monitor asserted in 2008 that 
“knowledgeable sources … have al-
leged that Sri Lankan security forces 
used AP mines in 2007 and 2008.”11 
Nevertheless, the government of Sri 
Lanka consistently asserted that it 
did not resume mine use.12
While the use of AP mines 
is always a cause for concern, it 
would be particularly disturb-
ing if mines were laid in areas that 
had previously been cleared and 
deemed mine-safe. It is not appar-
ent whether any of the alleged mine 
use was in areas that had already 
been cleared of mines, although at 
least one of the apparently credible 
allegations of AP mine use made 
against the LTTE was in the center 
of a village that had been resettled 
after a previous round of fighting, 
and it was subsequently evacuated 
again.13 Because the LTTE still had 
not renounced AP mine use, Gene-
va Call urged the LTTE, at the very 
least, to refrain from laying mines in 
areas that had already been cleared 
of AP mines.11
Reduced Operational Effectiveness 
Mine action became increasingly 
hampered by the escalation of con-
flict, and the deterioration of the sit-
uation affected ongoing mine-action 
activities in a variety of intercon-
nected ways. By 2006, those agencies 
that were working in LTTE-control-
led areas were citing the security 
situation as a reason for slower-than-
expected implementation of mine-
clearance activities.14 In these areas, 
the work of mine-action agencies was 
reportedly disrupted by the recruit-
ment, both voluntary and forced, of 
staff by “local security forces.”11 
A marked minefield in northern Sri Lanka.
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Clearly defined mined areas—mostly fenced and 
marked—led to a Level Two Survey being conducted 
in just six months, a task described as “impossible in 
any other country.”
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Demining in Sri Lanka.
PHOTO COURTESY OF TAMIL REHABILITATIOn ORGAnISATIOn
In government-controlled areas, 
the volatile security situation also 
affected mine-clearance activities, with 
operations reportedly being affected by 
the surge in violence.11 The Landmine 
Monitor noted that the operating en-
vironment was becoming increasingly 
ineffective because of tighter controls 
on the movement of people, equip-
ment and supplies.11 The imposition of 
work permits for expatriate workers re-
portedly affected the operations of hu-
manitarian agencies.15 The movement 
of mine-clearance equipment into 
LTTE-controlled areas was reportedly 
problematic even before the escalation 
in conflict.16 However, it became even 
more difficult as the situation deterio-
rated, and beginning in August 2006, 
restrictions on the movement of vari-
ous items, such as fuel, affected the ef-
fectiveness of mine-clearance agencies 
operating in these areas. Of particu-
lar concern was the prohibition of the 
movement of the personal protective 
equipment utilized by deminers.17
While a number of agencies, in-
cluding Norwegian People’s Aid, Swiss 
Foundation for Mine Action, Danish 
Demining Group and Mines Advi-
sory Group, were initially operating 
in LTTE-controlled areas in the north, 
by 2007 only NPA still had the neces-
sary permission from the government 
to work there. However, in January 
2008, NPA suspended operations, as-
serting that it had no choice in the mat-
ter because its Technical Advisors were 
not granted permission to re-enter the 
LTTE-controlled areas after a routine 
stand-down in their operations.17 By 
the end of 2008, NPA ceased its opera-
tions in Sri Lanka altogether.18
Loss of Mine-action Workers
Perhaps the starkest and most 
unwelcome illustration of how the 
deteriorating security environment 
affected mine action is the violent 
disappearance and death of mine-
action staff. By any standards, Sri 
Lanka has been a dangerous place 
for humanitarian actors. Forty-
three humanitarian workers have 
reportedly been murdered in Sri 
Lanka since the beginning of 2006, 
while 20 more individuals were re-
ported missing.19 Five of those mur-
dered, and nine of those that have 
disappeared, reportedly worked for 
international mine-action agencies. 
Most of the incidents occurred when 
the staff members were off duty or 
on the way to or from work. These 
incidents, besides being abhorrent, 
served to undermine the opera-
tional effectiveness of the agencies 
in question. For instance, after the 
murder of a DDG staff member in 
Jaffna in August 2007, the organi-
zation suspended its operations for 
nearly two weeks.11
With only a few exceptions,20 af-
fected agencies did not make public 
comments about the deaths or dis-
appearances of their staff. This reti-
cence has been in stark contrast to 
incidents that involved the killing 
or abduction of other humanitarian 
staff; these humanitarian agencies 
issued statements condemning at-
tacks, and where relevant, called for 
the release of staff. 
There may be a number of fac-
tors behind this different approach. 
The author was told by a mine-action 
program manager that an incident in-
volving the abduction of a staff mem-
ber of his agency did not necessitate 
a response, as it was considered un-
likely that the staff member had been 
targeted because of his work for the 
agency, but for other reasons unrelat-
ed to his professional life.21 In other 
instances, mine-action agencies may 
have viewed that issuing public state-
ments was not worthwhile, because 
such measures had proved ineffective 
in either stopping the killings or lead-
ing to the release of those abducted. 
Furthermore, agencies may have also 
been concerned that in an increasing-
ly polarized situation, any comment 
might be construed as critical of one 
party or another, and would compro-
mise their neutrality. 
Shifting Priorities
The increase in conf lict led to 
the emergence of new needs for 
mine-clearance expertise, par-
ticularly in respect to battle-area 
clearance. In 2008, the Landmine 
Monitor noted that mine action in 
Sri Lanka had shifted from being a 
development- and reconstruction-
related activity to being focused 
largely on responding to imme-
diate unexploded-ordnance and 
mine-contamination threats.11 
Some agencies expressed con-
cerns about the prioritization of 
tasks in this new environment. It 
was felt that the National Steering 
Committee for Mine Action had 
been sidelined, and that decisions 
about priorities were primarily made 
by the military. It was reported that 
there was pressure put on agencies to 
concentrate their efforts on support-
ing the clearance of areas to allow for 
the return of the recently displaced. 
While positive in itself, one agency 
felt that the prioritization was driv-
en by political—rather than human-
itarian—concerns, as the numbers of 
displaced people received increased 
international attention. Further-
more, some expressed skepticism 
about the quality of clearance that 
could be carried out within the new-
ly imposed time frame.22
Withdrawal of Donor Support
Increasing concern about a drift 
toward renewed conflict led to a 
review of funding priorities by a 
number of donors. Some govern-
ments decided that it was not ap-
propriate to fund mine clearance at 
a time when there was a real risk of 
a resumption of mine use by either, 
or both, of the involved parties. 
Geneva Call was informed that the 
Netherlands had withdrawn funding 
for this reason,23 and later, Switzerland 
followed suit.24 In a speech made to 
commemorate the International Day 
for Mine Awareness 2006, the U.K. 
Ambassador to Sri Lanka announced 
that because Sri Lanka was still not a 
signatory to the AP Mine Ban Conven-
tion, no more funds for mine clear-
ance would be made available that 
year. Furthermore, he stated that 
unless there was progress toward a 
ban, funding in the following year 
would go toward survey activities 
only. He stated, “This may appear a 
tough line, but what is the point of 
financing the lifting of landmines 
only to see them being put back into 
the ground when conflict recurs or 
security demands [use of mines]?”25 
Forty-three humanitarian workers 
have reportedly been murdered 
in Sri Lanka since the beginning 
of 2006, while 20 more individuals 
were reported missing.
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A boy looks at an nCBL brochure during a mine-risk education class conducted by nCBL in Bardiya district, nepal.
ALL PHOTOS COURTESY OF nCBL © 2009
The approach of linking fund-
ing to progress toward an AP mine 
ban was not unanimously accepted. 
The Tamil Rehabilitation Organisa-
tion, which operated humanitarian- 
demining teams in LTTE-controlled 
areas, expressed that the pressure 
placed on parties involved in the 
conflict to make mine-ban commit-
ments amounted to “politicization” 
of mine-action funding, and that it 
led to very short-term funding and 
was problematic for agencies carry-
ing out the work.26
During the early years of the 
cease-fire, there were a number of 
national and international actors in-
volved in attempts to convince the 
parties to move toward a ban on the 
use of AP mines. However, progress 
was limited; the government linked 
accession to the AP Mine Ban Con-
vention to reaching an agreement 
with the LTTE over the “non-use” 
of landmines, while the LTTE made 
it clear that they would only consid-
er banning the weapon if significant 
progress toward peace was made.5
As the conflict escalated, the op-
portunities and prospects for ad-
vocacy were reduced. There was 
increasing hostility to any initiative 
that seemingly limited the means 
and methods of warfare. Geneva 
Call, which had been engaging the 
LTTE in a ban on landmines with 
the endorsement of the Sri Lankan 
government,27 was soon no longer 
granted permission by the government 
to visit LTTE-controlled areas to pro-
ceed with this engagement.28 Later, the 
organization was informed by the 
government that it would not even 
be granted the necessary permission 
to enter the country. The Sri Lanka 
Campaign to Ban Landmines was 
basically inactive by 2006. Similarly, 
the Landmine Ban Advocacy Forum 
ceased to function toward the end 
of 2007. It is noteworthy that advo-
cacy seems to have diminished at 
the same time that allegations of re-
newed mine use were surfacing. 
A general increase in hostility to-
ward NGOs also affected agencies 
involved in mine action. In 2006, 
mine-clearance agencies operat-
ing in LTTE-controlled areas were 
criticized for cooperating with the 
Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation 
at a time when the LTTE was car-
rying out attacks with command-
detonated “claymore” devices.29 It 
is notable that despite the presence 
of mine-action agencies in LTTE- 
controlled areas—including at that 
time the Tamil Rehabilitation Or-
ganisation, which was working un-
der the coordination of the National 
Steering Committee for Mine Action—
there was no public clarification by 
government officials of the impor-
tant humanitarian role played by the 
mine-clearance agencies. 
Conclusion
The escalation of conflict in Sri 
Lanka profoundly affected mine ac-
tion. Some of the challenges were 
predictable, though others could not 
have been foreseen. To ensure that 
they remain effective, mine-action 
agencies and donors working in the 
context of ongoing conflict must be 
able to carefully monitor and assess 
developments, and respond quickly 
and appropriately to new challenges 
as, and when, they emerge. Similar-
ly, affected states must ensure that, 
even in the midst of conflict, they 
strive to cultivate an environment 
conducive to mine action. Howev-
er, since the collapse of the LTTE in 
May 2009, recent efforts have been 
made to improve mine action. Orga-
nizations including UNICEF, U.N. 
Development Programme, Mines 
Advisory Group and Handicap In-
ternational are conducting mine ac-
tion in Sri Lanka, with numerous 
other projects taking place.30
See Endnotes, Page 77 
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The Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) and the govern-ment of Nepal signed a compre-
hensive peace agreement on 21 November 
2006. The tireless efforts of NCBL enabled 
both parties to agree to incorporate impor-
tant points on landmines and improvised 
explosive devices into the CPA. The provi-
Despite the signing of a 2006 peace agreement by the Nepalese government and the 
Maoists, Nepal’s mine clearance remains a work in progress due to the after-effects 
of its decade-long Maoist conflict and the emergence of small, armed groups. Ban 
Landmines Campaign Nepal (NCBL) is at the forefront of the country’s mine-risk- 
education efforts. This article examines NCBL’s MRE program objectives, expecta-
tions, methods, and achievements, as well as the many challenges it faces.
by Purna Shova Chitrakar [ Ban Landmines Campaign Nepal ]
Mine-risk Education in Nepal, 2009
sion directs the parties to map landmines 
and other explosive devices within 30 days 
of the signing of the agreement and destroy 
such mines and devices within 60 days. De-
spite this commitment, only 17 out of 53 
minefields, and 99 out of more than 285 
improvised-explosive-device fields were 
cleared by mid-2009. 
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